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Abstract
Cloud computing provides an effective business model for the deployment of IT infrastructure,
platform, and software services. Often, facilities are outsourced to cloud providers and this offers the
service consumer virtualization technologies without the added cost burden of development. However,
virtualization introduces serious threats to service delivery such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks,
Cross-VM Cache Side Channel attacks, Hypervisor Escape and Hyper-jacking. One of the most
sophisticated forms of attack is the cross-VM cache side channel attack that exploits shared cache
memory between VMs. A cache side channel attack results in side channel data leakage, such as
cryptographic keys. Various techniques used by the attackers to launch cache side channel attack are
presented, as is a critical analysis of countermeasures against cache side channel attacks.
Keywords Cloud Computing, Virtualization, Security, Cross-VM Cache Side Channels

1 Introduction
In this paper we address specific concerns for the management of secure computing in a Cloud
Computing (CC) environment. The paper presents the results of a systematic review of factors relating
to cross-VM cache side channel attacks and countermeasures to prevent attacks or mitigate successful
intrusions.
CC is marketed as Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Software-as-aService (SaaS) to customers (Modi et al. 2013; Hashizume et al. 2013; Chhabra and Dixit 2015; You et
al. 2012; Srinivasan et al. 2012; Ayala et al. 2013). It offers individuals and organizations the use of
outsourced services through the Internet and typically through a pay-per-use model, as opposed to
buying and setting up resources in-house (Khorshed et al 2012; Modi et al. 2013; Chhabra and Dixit
2015; Srinivasan et al. 2012; Vaquero et al. 2011).
Besides providing a cost effective solution, the CC environment also gives benefits such as elasticity
(Khorshed et al 2012; You et al. 2012; Srinivasan et al. 2012; Ayala et al. 2013; Tianfield 2012),
scalability (Hashizume et al. 2013; Chhabra and Dixit 2015; Vaquero et al. 2011) and multi-tenancy
(Hashizume et al. 2013; Chhabra and Dixit 2015; Tianfield 2012).
Virtualization is core to CC (Shoaib and Das 2014) and helps Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) create a
multi-tenanted architecture. Virtualization is the simulation of hardware and/or software upon which
different other software and applications can run. Virtualization allows the sharing of hardware
resources between different tenants by creating Virtual Machines (VM) (Chhabra and Dixit 2015) that
emulate the physical server system. For example, by using virtualization in IaaS, customers can create,
share, copy and migrate VMs (Hashizume et al. 2013) and install different operating systems, and
install and run software according to their unique requirements (Chhabra and Dixit 2015). The
virtualization management system, Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) ensures that the VMs running on
the shared hardware are isolated from each other as separate entities (You et al. 2012).
A VMM or hypervisor is the software layer between hardware and the host operating system of the
hardware server (You et al. 2012). The VMM sets the platform for virtualization by allowing the
creation and management of different VMs on a server. The hypervisor controls the flow of
instructions between the guest VM operating system and the physical hardware (Ayala et al. 2013),

1

Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2015, Adelaide, South Australia

Shahzad & Litchfield
Cross-VM Side Channel Attacks

involving elements such as CPU core, cache memory, main memory, hard drives and network interface
cards.

Figure 1: Threats and Vulnerabilities to CC
Hypervisors have two broad categories: a) Native or bare-metal virtualization hypervisors, such as
XenServer, Microsoft Hyper-V and VMware ESX/EXSi; b) Hosted virtualization hypervisor, for
example VMware Workstation/Player, Kernel-based VM (KVM), Microsoft Virtual PC and Oracle
VirtualBox (Pek et al. 2013). However, a detailed analysis by Diego et al. (2013) shows that
vulnerabilities exist in the popular open source XEN and KVM hypervisors. These have been reported
in vulnerability databases; National Vulnerability Database (NVD), Red Hat Bugzilla, Security Focus
and CSV Details. The vulnerabilities present in these hypervisors are characterized and furthermore,
the categories of vulnerabilities are integrated to identify attack paths. This provides the opportunity
for countermeasures to be developed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A discussion about known threats and vulnerabilities in
each cloud service model is presented in section 2. Section 3 explains the cross-VM side-channel
attack. In section 4, cache side channel attack is explained along with, its different types and the
techniques used to launch these attacks. We discuss cache side-channel attacks in the virtualized
environment in section 5. Section 6 presents the results of an analysis of existing countermeasures
proposed to defend against these attacks.

2 Threats and Vulnerabilities in Cloud Computing
In this section, we discuss threats and vulnerabilities in CC, some common threats and vulnerabilities
are highlighted in detail, and account and service hijacking.
Vulnerability refers to a weakness or flaw in a system that can be exploited by an event called an
attack (Hashizume et al. 2013; Tianfield 2012). A threat (see Figure 1) is an exploitation of any known
vulnerability that can result in serious loss of data and information (Modi et al. 2013). These threats
and vulnerabilities are perceived as a barrier for organizations wishing to adopt cloud services
(Hashizume et al. 2013). The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has highlighted top threats to CC (Alva et
al. 2013).
Data Breaches and Loss are very severe threats because of cloud services’ shared architecture. Data
loss can occur if data are being deleted without having backup or if there is any disaster and no proper
mechanisms are adopted to recover it (Khorshed et al 2012).
Confidentiality, integrity and availability of customer’s data are put at risk (Alva et al. 2013) when an
attacker has a chance to hijack a user’s account details by stealing user credentials and information. An
attacker may use various methods such as phishing, DoS and Man-in-the-Middle attack to steal user
credentials (Khorshed et al. 2012) and then use them to eavesdrop on a user’s activities and
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transactions. More sophisticated attacks involve combinations of these methods for pecuniary gain.
Some methods for which successful attacks may be achieved include:


Insecure Application Programing Interfaces (APIs): A CSP offers infrastructure, software and
platform services to customers and gives them access to services through Application Programing
Interfaces (APIs) (Khorshed et al 2012; Chhabra and Dixit 2015; Ayala et al. 2013). Users manage
services they consume by using these APIs (Modi et al. 2013), for example, PaaS APIs provide
access and functionality for cloud, SaaS APIs provide connectivity to applications, IaaS APIs
provides control and distribution over specific cloud resources.



Confidentiality, integrity and authentication of a cloud service are very much dependent on how
APIs are designed and developed (Hashizume et al. 2013; Vaquero et al. 2011; Ayala et al. 2013).
Thus, it is the responsibility of the designer and developer to make it difficult for malicious users
to exploit potential vulnerabilities. For example, design flaws of the APIs to the underlying SSL
libraries (Georgiev et al. 2012) provide leverage for a user with malicious intent to execute harmful
actions (Srinivasan et al. 2012).



Malicious Insider: Confidentiality, integrity and availability may be violated if customer data
abuse occurs from someone with authorized access but with malicious intent (Alva et al. 2013).
The malicious insider threat may become apparent because of a lack of transparency in CSP
processes and procedures and the level of access each employee has to customer data (Modi et al.
2013; Srinivasan et al. 2012).



Abuse of Cloud Resources: CSPs give free trials of IaaS to customers in order to convince them to
purchase this service later on. However, due to a lack of control exercised by the CSP, customers
may take the opportunity to perform malicious activities using the powerful hardware platform
provided by the CSP (Khorshed et al. 2012; Modi et al. 2013). Furthermore, such hardware gives
them chance to crack encryption keys (Modi et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2013).



Shared Technology Vulnerabilities: Virtualization provides multi-tenancy through the sharing of
hardware resources like CPU cores, high level cache, storage devices and network interface cards
among different tenants (Ayala et al. 2013). The hypervisor provides a platform for virtualization
and is responsible for isolation between different VMs running on a shared server.

By exploiting vulnerabilities or configuration flaws, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to a
hypervisor to control a cloud platform and exploit other customers’ VMs (Khorshed et al. 2012; Modi
et al. 2013). For example, infrastructure sharing is one core cloud service but because of hardware
sharing limitations, lacks basic protection mechanisms to protect customer network traffic, data and
other applications. This provides an attacker a chance to hijack user credentials, eavesdrop on
information and control other users’ VMs (Khorshed et al. 2012).
Shah and Vania (2014) highlight two common vulnerabilities present in virtualization technology, VM
hopping (co-resident attack) and VM Migration/Mobility vulnerabilities. The VM live migration
process exposes guest OS information on the fly. Through VM hopping an attacker can extract
information from a co-resident VM by exploiting the shared cache memory among different VMs that
are running co-resident with the attacker’s VM.

3 Cross-VM Side Channel Attacks
Cross-VM side channel attacks are identified as a very sophisticated attack in CC. In cases where there
exist shared hardware resources, the side channel attack exploits information obtained from the usage
of, for example, Central Processing Unit (CPU) core and high level cache memory as opposed to
exploiting theoretical weaknesses like the brute force attack (Vaquero et al. 2011).
In a typical cross-VM side channel attack scenario, an adversary places a malicious VM co-resident to
the target VM so that they share the same hardware resources (Ristenpart et al. 2009). Then, the
attacker extracts useful information such as cryptographic keys from the target VM (Zhang et al. 2012)
to use them for traffic eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Through the side channel attack,
an attacker sharing the same cache as the victim can monitor the cache access behaviour of the victim.
For example, the attacker is able to monitor cache timing information by measuring the execution of
different operations on the victim’s VM (Zhang and Lee 2014). Generally, the attacker exploits timings
in the shared high-level cache memory. However, power consumption or electromagnetic leaks can
also be used as a vector to launch side channel attacks (Vaquero et al. 2011).
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4 Cache-Based Side Channel Attacks
4.1 Cache Architecture
The modern x64 microprocessor has multiple levels of cache: Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. In a
processor with multiple cores and three levels of cache, each processor core has its own separate L1
and L2 cache while L3 cache is shared among all the cores of the processor (Yarom and Falkner 2013;
Kim et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2011). Therefore, the shared architecture of L3 cache among different
cores creates an opportunity for a malicious user to exploit it and launch a side channel attack.
In a typical scenario, when the processor needs data, it checks L1, L2 and L3 caches respectively. If the
requested data are present at any level then the data are read and a cache hit occurs. However, if data
are not available in any cache level, then a cache miss occurs and the processor gets data from RAM
and places it in the cache ready for the next call. In the event of a cache miss, the processor may also
take advantage of spatial locality by fetching data from near cache locations, because it is expected that
data in near cache locations are going to be accessed soon (Irazoqui et al., 2014a; 2014b). Moreover,
data fetched from RAM and placed in cache are in fixed sized blocks called cache lines, and a cache
entry is created during this process.

4.2 Cache Organization
To gain an understanding of cache organisation and the role of cache-hypervisor relationship, types of
cache organisation are described.

Figure 2: Cache Organisation
Cache consists of cache pages and cache lines (see Figure 2 on the previous page). The main memory
(RAM) is divided into a number of cache pages. The size of each cache page depends on the overall size
of cache. The cache page is further divided into a number of fixed size cache lines. The type of
processor and the cache design defines the size of each cache line (Intel 2014).
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4.2.1 Fully Associative
This scheme allows only lines, not cache pages, to move from main memory to cache. Figure 3
illustrates that any line from main memory can be located at any location on the cache.

Figure 3: Fully Associative Cache

4.2.2 Direct-Mapping
Direct mapping in cache is also called 1-Way set associative cache. In this scheme, the size of each
main memory page is equal to the size of the cache. Specific lines from main memory move to the same
line of the cache as shown in Figure 4. For example, the first line of the first main memory page is
stored in the first cache line. Later, if the second main memory page’s first line needs to be stored in
the first cache line, then the first page’s line needs to be evicted.

Figure 4: Direct Mapping Cache
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4.2.3 Set-Associative
Set-Associative (Figure 5) combines the above schemes and divides the cache into equal sections called
ways. The size of the cache page is equal to the size of a cache way. This scheme allows 2 or 4
(typically) lines of main memory pages to be stored on the same cache lines of 2 or 4 cache ways at any
time.

Figure 5: Set Associative Cache
Cache is normally configured as a set associative map (Zhang and Reiter 2013). A w-way set
associative cache is partitioned into m sets and with w lines in each set. Each block of data from RAM
is placed into one cache set m, but can be placed at any of w lines within the set (Zhang et al. 2011).
For data that have already been moved to cache, then if data are accessed by a cryptographic algorithm
such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) from one of the cache lines then the cache will be
accessed much faster. The algorithm’s data encryption/decryption time depends on the accessed table
positions and timing information, which can be exploited to gain access to the private keys used
(Irazoqui et al., 2014a; 2014b). Therefore, cache timing information is important for side channel
attack.

4.3 Cache Side Channel Attack Techniques
Side channel attacks are very sophisticated attacks on cryptographic algorithms like AES, resulting in
the leakage of encryption keys used by these algorithms. In a side channel attack, an adversary exploits
the information gained from hardware implementation such as shared cache memory timing,
electromagnetic radiation or power consumption of the system.
Over the last few years, cache side channel attacks have been demonstrated using different techniques.
For cache side channels, there are two types of technique:


Prime + Probe Technique: Prime + Probe is a common technique used by an attacker in order to
learn shared cache behaviour and more specifically, which cache set is accessed by the target.
Explained in next section, Tromer et al. (2010), Ristenpart et al. (2009), Zhang et al. (2012), and
Liu et al. (2015) use the Prime + Probe technique to launch access-driven cache side channel
attacks. In order to observe cache usage by a victim’s process, the attacker runs a spy process in
parallel to observe the status.



Flush + Reload Technique: In a Flush + Reload cache side channel attack, an attacker runs a spy
process that monitors shared memory pages accessed by the victim’s process. Using a spy process,
the attacker can monitor the memory lines that a victim’s process has evicted from the cache. By
monitoring processes, the attacker is able to determine which memory lines the victim accessed.
From this information, the attacker can extract information from the data processed by the victim.
Yarom and Falkner (2013), Yarom and Benger (2014), and Irazoqui (2014b) use the Flush +
Reload technique to demonstrate a cache side channel attack in a virtualized environment.
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4.4 Types of Cache Side Channel Attacks
Cache based side channel attacks have three types: time-driven, access-driven and trace-driven. In all
the cases, the attacker uses the shared cache to monitor the activities of another VM in a hypervisor.
The types are differentiated by the means by which monitoring occurs.

4.4.1 Time-driven
In this type of cache side channel attack, an attacker exploits the correlation between the cryptographic
operation and cache misses of a victim (Kong et al. 2009). That is, an adversary measures the time a
victim’s process takes to complete a whole operation such as the time it takes to undertake a
cryptographic process while memory is being accessed. This is achievable because the amount of time
it takes for memory to be accessed is dependent upon the state of the cache. The attacker compares the
different execution times of processes against inputs and looks for specific patterns. The difference in
timings can be used as leverage to extract information about encryption keys.

4.4.2 Access-driven
This attack provides an adversary with a platform to execute a malicious process in parallel with the
victim’s cryptographic process to derive an insight into the victim’s cache behaviour (Kong et al.
2009). The attacker learns what cache sets have been accessed by the victim’s cryptographic operation
by evicting the victim’s cache memory pages. This forces the victim to have a cache miss and then the
attacker may observe cache miss behaviour with the knowledge that the operation being performed is
that instigated by the victim.

4.4.3 Trace-driven
In this cache side channel attack an attacker monitors the cache lines accessed in a cache set by the
victim and obtains a profile of cache activity during an encryption process. This sets the platform for
an attacker to measure memory lines accessed by the cryptographic operation and that resulted in a
cache hit. Zhao and Wang (2010) present a trace-driven attack on AES by monitoring cache miss
information and S-box misalignment; around 200 samples of cache miss trace information were
enough to extract a complete 128-bit AES within seconds.

5 Cache Side Channel Attacks in the Virtualized Environment
In this section we provide evidence of the effectiveness of side channel attacks through the application
of a number of techniques. The cache-based side channel attack presents a serious threat to the cloud
virtual environment. Whereas the client server based network environment makes it difficult to
undertake this type of attack, it is the shared hardware resources that characterise a typical hypervisor
environment that permits the cache side channel attack. As described in the previous section, an
attacker sharing the same cache as a victim can monitor the cache access behaviour of the victim, such
as cache timing information, by measuring the execution of different operations on the victim’s VM
(Zhang and Lee 2014). Cache timing information gives an adversary a platform from which to launch a
side channel attack to break cryptographic algorithms (Godfrey and Zulkernine 2013) and thus to
extract encryption keys. In the virtual environment, prior to the cross-VM side channel attack, the
attacker needs to identify the target VM’s location and place a malicious VM co-resident with the
target. Later, that attacker may use the maliciously placed VM to extract information from the target
VM with the side channel attack.
Using Amazon EC2 as case study, Ristenpart et al. (2009) explains that it is possible to map the cloud
infrastructure to find out that where a particular target VM resides. Two VMs are co-located on the
shared hardware by exploiting EC2’s placement policy and since the cache is shared, the extraction of
keystroke timing information using access-driven side channel attack is enabled.
In a different example in which both access and timing approaches are used, Zhang et al. (2012)
present an access-driven cross VM side channel attack on a symmetric multiprocessing system and
extract useful information from a target VM. Through a cache timing attack, they recover an ElGamal
decryption key from the victim VM using the libgcrypt cryptographic library.
Yarom and Falkner (2013) present a cross CPU-cores side channel attack by exploiting and monitoring
memory page sharing between different processes. This attack is based on the new Flush + Reload
technique that evict a memory line from the cache, allowing the attacker and target system to execute
at same time. Yarom and Benger (2014) extend this and present a Flush + Reload cache side channel
attack that exploits an x86 processor architecture as it allows one process to monitor another process’
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access to cache memory pages. The attack highlights a serious threat to any cryptographic algorithm
based on OpenSSL implementation.
Using Bernstein’s correlation attack as a base for the first time in a virtual environment, Irazoqui et al.
(2014a) show that cross-VM side channel attacks on VMware, Xen and KVM are possible. Despite
running on different CPU cores on the same hardware, VMs are vulnerable to side channel attacks
resulting in the leakage of AES keys by using the timing difference between cache line accesses. Weiss
et al. (2012) extend the Bernstein correlation attack by demonstrating a time-driven cache attack on an
embedded ARM based operating system platform, bypassing the isolation characteristics of
virtualization.
Irazoqui (2014b) use the Flush + Reload cache side channel attack on VMs running on a VMware
hypervisor. The attack exploits a memory de-duplication mechanism called transparent page sharing.
The result is a very fast full recovery of keys from the AES implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.1.

6 Cache Side Channel Attack Countermeasures
The shared cache between different cores of modern processors is a concern because it permits side
channel attacks. Previously, we present an overview of side channel attacks exploiting cache memory.
The problem in cache design is cache contention, which allows different users’ processes to evict the
contents of a cache that is used by other users (Jin et al. 2009). In this section and keeping shared
cache vulnerabilities in mind, to defend against cache side channel attacks, a range of mitigation and
prevention techniques or countermeasures are presented.
In Table 1, cache side channel attack countermeasures are critically analysed and present the following
types of solution:


Hardware-based Solutions: Page (2005), Domnitser et al. (2012), and Kong et al. (2013) propose
new designs for a shared cache wherein cache portions are created and by isolating these portions
from each other, each CPU core is each assigned a separate portion.



Software-based Solutions: Coppens et al. (2009), Jin et al. (2009), Aviram et al. (2010), Shi et al.
(2011), Zhang & Reiter (2013), and Godfrey and Zulkernine (2013) propose a software based
solution to protect against side channel attacks in a client-server based network as well as a cloud
environment.



Hypervisor-based Solutions: Raj et al. (2009), Vattikonda et al. (2011), Kim et al. (2012), and Wu
et al. (2014) propose a solution involving changes at the hypervisor level.

Paper Title

Author

Solution Proposed

Limitations

Partitioned Cache
Architecture as a
Side-Channel
Defence
Mechanism

Page, D.

Cache partition based solution.
Design makes cache the visible
part of the architecture and
divides it into regions. Each
individual cache region is
allocated to a separate
application, reducing the
chances of interference as
compared to single shared
cache

Solution requires changes to
underlying hardware design
that can create significant
performance degradation.
Moreover, the solution
conflicts with the cloud model
either by restricting hardware
requirements or customers of
CSP need to have additional
skills.

Table 1. Analysis of Cache Side Channel Attack Countermeasures
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Paper Title

Author

Solution Proposed

Limitations

Nonmonopolizable
caches: Lowcomplexity
mitigation of
cache side
channel attacks

Domnitser et
al.

Cache partitioning technique
with minor changes in cache
replacement logic without
influencing overall cache core
circuitry. Dynamically reserves
cache lines for legitimate users
by restricting an attacker to
only accessing unreserved
cache lines

The solution is only effective
when the attacker’s malicious
process is running in parallel
with a victim’s process.
Furthermore, it is difficult to
find any general hardware
based solutions that are
adopted in mainstream
processors as such solutions
are tested qualitatively.

Architecting
against software
cache-based sidechannel attacks

Kong et al.

Mitigation technique that
hides or obfuscates cache
access by different cores

The solution leads to different
challenges in design
modification. Requires code
changes to make the solution
understand branch prediction
analysis based side channel
attack and to protect the
information. Moreover,
modifications to mitigate side
channel attack can impact the
performance of the system

Practical
mitigations for
timing-based
side-channel
attacks on
modern x86
processors

Coppens et al.

Compiler based side channel
mitigation technique to defend
against timing side channel
attacks in non-cloud
environment. They modify the
compiler to remove
dependencies of control flow
on cryptographic functions,
such as secret keys

The hardware solution lacks
generality and gives poor
performance. Furthermore
proposed solution leaves cloud
applications vulnerable to
trace-driven attacks

A simple cache
partitioning
approach in a
virtualized
environment

Jin et al.

Static page colouring cache
partitioning technique that is
implemented in Xen VMM
environment. The proposed
approach restricts L2 shared
cache exploitation and its
implementation in VMM is
fully transparent to guest VMs

The proposed approach
allocates static cache pages to
VMs that results in a limited
number of cache sets available
for use by VMs requiring
cache access. This results in
degradation of system
performance not only for the
VMs that have already secured
a cache portion but also for
the other VMs that need to
have cache access

Table 1: Continued
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Paper Title

Author

Solution Proposed

Limitations

Determinating
timing channels
in compute clouds

Aviram et al.

A software method to prevent
timing channel based attack on
a CSP enforced deterministic
execution as compared to
hardware based solution such
as cache partitioning

The proposed solution forces
the VMs execution to be
deterministic to protect
against timing channel
attacks, resulting in many
applications being left
vulnerable. Needs fine grain
timing information for
execution in cloud
environment

Limiting cachebased sidechannel in multitenant cloud
using dynamic
page colouring

Shi et al.

Dynamic cache memory page
colouring technique that
provides strong cache isolation
between different processes of
security critical operations

From the client end, the
approach requires
modification to the
components of a hypervisor.
Prohibits the use of some
features that a VM can have.
Therefore, such a solution
limits its adoption in a cloud
environment

A server-side
solution to cachebased sidechannel attacks in
the cloud

Godfrey, M.
and
Zulkernine, M.

A mitigation technique for a
cloud server by disabling the
overlapping characteristics of
cache memory, ensuring
isolation in the cache portion
accessed by VMs. Technique
uses cache flushing between
prime and trigger functions

The solution limits the
utilization of the available
resources the VMs that results
in greater costs

Duppel:
Retrofitting
commodity
operating systems
to mitigate cache
side channels in
the cloud

Zhang, Y. and
Reiter, M. K.

A system called Duppel that
adds noise to complicate cache
timing signals. Duppel adds
noise by cleaning L1 cache
frequently in parallel with the
execution of its tenant
workload, at a speed that it
adjusts by assuming what
timings reflect the workload
execution being monitored by
another VM

In a Simultaneous
Multithreading (SMT)
architecture, this scheme
needs the user to identify the
process that needs to be
protected, making the solution
infeasible for protection
against side channel attacks.
Furthermore, it decreases
cache efficiency because of the
time needed to do the flush

Table 1: Continued
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Paper Title

Author

Solution Proposed

Limitations

Resource
management for
isolation
enhanced cloud
services

Raj et al.

The shared cache is partitioned
into several regions, with
specific cache lines using page
colouring. It provides isolation
between different VMs by
allowing them to access only
certain lines by partitioning
memory pages

Solution provides static cache
partitioning for each VM
separately which increases
overhead on the system when
CSP wants to run more VMs
on the same physical machine

Eliminating fine
grained timers in
Xen

Vattikonda et
al.

A mitigation approach by
modifying RDTSC instruction
on Xen based VMs. It reduces
the VMs’ access to cache
timing information by
providing a fuzzy timer instead
of fine-grained timers.

The proposed solution
protects against timing
channel attacks. However, it is
not feasible for applications
running in the cloud that need
fine-grained timing
information

STEALTHMEM:
System-Level
Protection
Against CacheBased Side
Channel Attacks
in the Cloud

Kim et al.

A dynamically last level cache
partitioning mechanism that
protects the cache by locking
cache lines per processor core.
VMs running on each core
loads data into these locked
cache lines called stealth
pages, which cannot be evicted
by another VM

The solution partitions the
cache and assigns a separate
portion of cache to each VM.
However, it needs user
interaction for client side
modification if some
applications need access to
hidden pages of cache
memory. Therefore, the
solution is not appropriate for
the cloud

C2detector: a
covert channel
detection
framework in CC

Wu et al.

Presented as a framework by
making small modifications to
a cloud system. It uses a captor
located in the Xen hypervisor
and a synthesis analyser
implemented as Markov and
Bayesian for detection of three
types of covert channels
between VMs running on same
hardware server

The proposed solution
requires additional hardware
resources because of its
complex design. It is used for
policing purposes

Table 1: Continued

7 Implications of the Proposed Solutions
The shared cache memory partitioning or isolation and assigning of a separate portion of cache
memory to each VM can reduce or eliminate successful side channel attacks in a virtualized
environment. Cloud service providers seek fast or instantaneous delivery of services to customers but
to mitigate the effects of side channel attacks, the proposed solutions of cache partitioning require
changes and modifications to the underlying hardware design. The result of changes, as they are
proposed now, is an overall degradation of performance in the virtual environment. Although some
solutions may apply when hardware manufacturers make design changes. The alternative to making
changes to the hardware configuration is to provide a new cache partition technique may prove to be
very effective.
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8 Conclusion
Acquired from CSPs, virtualization is the core component of CC that provides isolation between the
different hardware and software services of customers. However along with its benefits, virtualization
has vulnerabilities. A common vulnerability in the virtualization environment is the share cache
memory that permits exploitation through a Cross-VM cache based side channel attack, resulting in
the leakage of AES cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present an overview of the potential for the
launching of a side channel attack in a virtual environment. We also present the results of a critical
analysis of solutions proposed by authors. From this analysis, we fail to see that there is an effective
countermeasure to the Cross-VM cache-based side channel attack despite that there is demand for a
strong defence mechanism by cloud services consumers.

9 References
Alva, A., Caleff, O., Greg, E., Lum, A., Pasley, K., Sudarsan, S. and Venkitaraman, R. 2013. “The
Notorious Nine:
Cloud Computing Top Threats
in
2013.
Cloud Security
Alliance.”
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/download/the-notorious-nine-cloud-comp
uting-top-threats-in-2013/ Retrieved 9 March, 2015.
Aviram, A., Hu, S., Ford, B. and Gummadi, R. 2010. “Determinating Timing Channels in Compute
Clouds,” ACM cloud computing security workshop, October, pp 103–108.
Ayala, I. D. C. L., Vega, M. and Vargas-Lombardo, M. 2013. “Emerging Threats, Risk and Attacks in
Distributed Systems: Cloud computing,” Innovations and Advances in Computer, Information,
Systems Sciences, and Engineering, NY: Springer.
Brona, S., Jignesh, V. 2014. “A Literature Survey on Virtualization Security Threats in Cloud
Computing,” International Journal of Science and Research (3:12), December, pp 1137-1140.
Chhabra, S. and Dixit, V. 2015. “Cloud Computing: State of the Art and Security Issues,” ACM
SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, (40:2), March, pp 1–11.
Coppens, B., Verbauwhede, I., De Bosschere, K. and De Sutter, B. 2009. “Practical Mitigations for
Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern X86 Processors,” 30th IEEE symposium on
Security and Privacy, May, pp 45–60.
Domnitser, L., Jaleel, A., Loew, J., Abu-Ghazaleh, N. and Ponomarev, D. 2012. “Nonmonopolizable
caches: Low-complexity Mitigation of Cache Side Channel Attacks,” ACM Transactions on
Architecture and Code Optimization (8:4), January, pp 35.
Diego, P. B., Jakub S., and Ruby, B. L. 2013. “Characterizing Hypervisor Vulnerabilities in Cloud
Computing Servers,” Cloud Computing’13, May.
Georgiev, M., Iyengar, S., Jana, S., Anubhai, R., Boneh, D. and Shmatikov, V. 2012. “The Most
Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-browser Software,” ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, October, pp 38–49.
Godfrey, M. and Zulkernine, M. 2013. “A Server-side Solution to Cache-based Side Channel Attacks in
the Cloud,” IEEE Sixth International Conference on Cloud Computing, July, pp 163–170.
Hashizume, K., Rosado, D. G., Fernández-Medina, E. and Fernandez, E. B. 2013. “An Analysis of
Security Issues for Cloud Computing,” Journal of Internet Services and Applications (4:1),
January, pp 1–13.
Irazoqui, G., Inci, M. S., Eisenbarth, T. and Sunar, B. 2014a. “Fine Grain Cross-VM Attacks on XEN
and VMware,” IEEE Fourth International Conference on Big Data and Cloud Computing,
October, pp 737–744.
Irazoqui, G., Inci, M. S., Eisenbarth, T. and Sunar, B. 2014b. Wait a Minute! A Fast, Cross-VM Attack
on AES. Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, CH: Springer.
Intel

Corporation. “Cache Overview and Organization.”
intarch/papers/cache6.pdf Retrieved 9 June, 2015.

http://download.intel.com/design/

Jin, X., Chen, H., Wang, X., Wang, Z., Wen, X., Luo, Y. and Li, X. 2009. “A Simple Cache Partitioning
Approach in a Virtualized Environment,” IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and
Distributed Processing with Applications, August, pp 519–524.

12

Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2015, Adelaide, South Australia

Shahzad & Litchfield
Cross-VM Side Channel Attacks

Khorshed, M. T., Ali, A. S. and Wasimi, S. A. 2012. “A Survey on Gaps, Threat Remediation Challenges
and Some Thoughts for Proactive Attack Detection in Cloud Computing,” Future Generation
Computer Systems (28:6), June, pp 833–851.
Kim, T., Peinado, M. and Mainar-Ruiz, G. 2012. “Stealthmem: System-level Protection Against Cachebased
Side
Channel
Attacks
in
the
Cloud,”
Usenix
Security
Symposium, August, pp 189–204.
Kong, J., Aciiçmez, O., Seifert, J.P. and Zhou, H. 2009. “Hardware-software Integrated Approaches to
Defend Against Software Cache-based Side Channel Attacks,” IEEE 15th International
Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture, February, pp 393–404.
Liu, F., Yarom, Y., Ge, Q., Heiser, G. and Lee, R. B. 2015. “Last-level Cache Side-Channel
Attacks are Practical,” 36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May.
Modi, C., Patel, D., Borisaniya, B., Patel, A. and Rajarajan, M. 2013. “A Survey on
Security Issues and Solutions at Different Layers of Cloud Computing,” The Journal
of Supercomputing (63:2), February, pp 561–592.
Page, D. 2005. “Partitioned Cache Architecture as a Side-Channel Defence Mechanism,” IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, https://eprint.iacr.org/ Retrieved: 1 May. 2015
Raj,

H., Nathuji, R., Singh, A. and England, P. 2009. “Resource Management for
Isolation Enhanced Cloud Services,” ACM Cloud Computing Security Workshop, November, pp
77–84.

Ristenpart, T., Tromer, E., Shacham, H. and Savage, S. 2009. “Hey, You, Get Off of My
Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-Party Compute Clouds,” ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, November, pp 199–212.
Shi,

J., Song, X., Chen, H. and Zang, B. 2011. “Limiting Cache-based Side-Channel
in Multi-Tenant Cloud Using Dynamic Page Colouring,” IEEE/IFIP 41st International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops, June, pp 194–199.

Shoaib, Y. and Das, O. 2014. “Pouring Cloud Virtualization
http://arxiv.org/abs/1411.3771 Retrieved 10 April, 2015

Security

inside

Out.”

Srinivasan, M. K., Sarukesi, K., Rodrigues, P., Manoj, M. S. and Revathy, P. 2012. “State-of-the-Art
Cloud
Computing
Security
Taxonomies:
A
Classification
of
Security
Challenges in the Present Cloud Computing Environment,” International Conference on
Advances in Computing, Communications and Informatics, August, pp 470–476.
Tianfield, H. 2012. “Security Issues in Cloud Computing,” IEEE International Conference on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics, October, pp 1082–1089.
Tromer, E., Osvik, D. A. and Shamir, A. 2010. “Efficient Cache Attacks on AES, and
Countermeasures,” Journal of Cryptology (23:1), January, pp 37–71.
Vaquero, L. M., Rodero-Merino, L. and Morán, D. 2011. “Locking the Sky: A Survey on
IaaS Cloud Security,” Computing Springer (91:1), January, pp 93–118.
Vattikonda, B. C., Das, S. and Shacham, H. 2011. “Eliminating Fine Grained Timers
in XEN,” 3rd ACM Cloud Computing Security Workshop, October, pp. 41–46.
Weiss, M., Heinz, B. and Stumpf, F. 2012. A Cache Timing Attack on AES in Virtualization
Environments. Financial cryptography and Data Security, NY: Springer.
Wu, J., Ding, L., Wu, Y., Min-Allah, N., Khan, S. U. and Wang, Y. 2014. “C2detector: A
Covert Channel Detection Framework in Cloud Computing,” Journal of Security and
Communication Networks (7:3), March, pp 544–557.
Yarom, Y. and Benger, N. 2014. “Recovering OPENSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the Flush+
Reload Cache Side-channel Attack,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, https://eprint.iacr.org/
Retrieved 23 April, 2015.
Yarom, Y. and Falkner, K. E. 2013. Flush + Reload: “A High Resolution, Low Noise, L3
Cache Side-channel Attack,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, https://www.usenix.org/
Retrieved 25 May, 2015.

13

Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2015, Adelaide, South Australia

Shahzad & Litchfield
Cross-VM Side Channel Attacks

You, P., Peng, Y., Liu, W. and Xue, S. 2012. “Security Issues and Solutions in Cloud
Computing,” 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshop,
June, pp 573–577.
Zhang, N., Liu, D. and Zhang, Y. 2013. “A Research on Cloud Computing Security,” International
Conference on Information Technology And Applications, November, pp 370–373.
Zhang, T. and Lee, R. B. 2014. “New Models of Cache Architectures Characterizing
Information Leakage from Cache Side Channels,” 30th Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference, December, pp 96–105.
Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Oprea, A. and Reiter, M. K. 2011. “Homealone: Co-residency
Detection in the Cloud via Side-Channel Analysis,” IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
May. pp 313–328.
Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K. and Ristenpart, T. 2012. “Cross-VM Side Channels and
Their
Use
to
Extract
Private
Keys,”
ACM
Conference
on
Computer and Communications Security, October, pp 305–316.
Zhang, Y. and Reiter, M. K. 2013. “Düppel: Retrofitting Commodity Operating Systems
to Mitigate Cache Side Channels in the Cloud,” ACM Conference on Computer &
Communications Security, November, pp 827–838.
Zhao, X.-J. and Wang, T. 2010. “Improved Cache Trace Attack on AES and ClEFIA by
Considering Cache Miss and S-Box Misalignment,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
http://eprint.iacr.org Retrieved 10 June, 2015.
Copyright: © 2015 AT Litchfield and A Shahzad. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Australia License, which permits
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and
ACIS are credited.

14

